A first: election system vendors admits losing votes

Here is a first-ever admission: a real software bug in a real voting system can drop real votes, and has dropped votes. And perhaps has been doing so for years. I wrote earlier about the wrangle between the state of Ohio and Premier Election Systems (formerly Diebold), in which some real vote dropping was blamed on anti-virus software (which wasn't allowed to be in the machines in the first place!).

No Guarantees: the Right to Vote

A recent New York Times editorial “The Right to Vote” explains how vote suppression is alive and well, with real barriers created to prevent people from voting, sometimes unintentionally, and sometime very much on partisan politics purpose. The most effective means are attacks on voter’s eligibility, by abusing voter registration information. (That’s one reason for OSDV’s efforts to create technology

Anti-virus and the anti-voting machine

There’s some intriguing and ironic details near the bottom of the on-going legal saga in Ohio.

Why Don’t the Votes Add Up?

A story from election integrity watchdog Mark L. provides yet another example the stark contrast between current election systems vendors current behavior and products, versus the kind of election transparency that’s needed to inspire trust in election results.

At issue the requirement that election systems product should track “undervotes” (the situation where a valid ballot contains no voter selection in a contest or measure) and report on the undervote rate.

What is Illegal in Georgia?

Here is a follow-up to yesterday's note on how Georgia provided an example of how black box devices undermine confidence and foster suspicion.

First, there is a recent New York Times article  A Tale of Three (Electronic Voting) Elections by Adam Cohen that provides some comparison of the Georgia incident with a couple others in which e-voting systems were apparently part of a suspect election result.

From Black Box to Conspiracy Theory in Georgia

As a sad example of suspicion arising from current e-voting systems, I'd like you to read a story that I don't really know how to believe -- which is my point.

Denver Goes "Back to Paper" -- Sort Of

A news article from Denver notes that the city is reversing its experiment from its last election, and going "back to paper."

It's Back to Paper Ballots, Precincts, For This Year's Elections 

This only sort of true. Yes, it's true that Denver is using a voting method that election officials say they're more comfortable with, and that some voters will likely view as more trustworthy. 

Reflection on Independence Day

Yesterday, on July 4th, I took some time to reflect on nearly 400 years of elections in North America, in the hopes of having something meaningful to share in this blog, not about technology, but something fundamental. With little immediate success, I picked up a book, and re-read some email from a friend.

"Privatized" Elections and Internet Programming

Attending and speaking at the Personal Democracy Forum last week, I came across a good phrase, "privatized elections," used to describe the widening role that private companies play in running U.S. government elections.

Test results on New Jersey e-voting machines will be released

Good news from New Jersey! A judge there has reversed her earlier decision that test results on Sequoia voting machines could not be made public -- a story that we discussed a few months ago here. The new ruling means that conmputer experts at Princeton University will be able to analyze the machines starting next week, and publish their results in late September before the November election.